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1 Introduction
The work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) highlight the impor-
tance of time consistency in policy making. Countries with a weak institutional framework
may lack the ability to commit to a future course of monetary policy. This problem arises
when a central bank tries to maximize (or minimize) an objective function with multiple
terms. There is the motivation to use policy to make temporary gains in some variables
(like output) by taking advantage of the fact that expectations about other variables (like
inflation) are fixed in the short run. In this case optimal monetary policy may be to switch
from a central bank objective where the central bank tries to maximize social welfare and
instead adopt a simpler single mandate.
This is the motivation behind the famous conservative central banker in Rogoff (1985). As
discussed by Bernanke, Laubach, and Mishkin (2001), an inflation targeting single mandate
can help overcome the time-inconsistency problem and an inflation target can help anchor
inflation expectations. Ever since the adoption of an inflation targeting single mandate by
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1989, there have been a number of empirical studies that
have shown that the adoption of an inflation targeting single mandate leads to a significant
reduction in inflation and inflation expectations in both developed and developing countries.1
Historically the adoption of a nominal exchange rate targeting single mandate has been
the preferred solution to the time-inconsistency problem in many countries.2 Bordo and
Kydland (1995) discuss this practice of pegging one’s currency to gain credibility in terms
of the pre-World War 1 gold standard. Bordo (2003) discusses how the development of
institutions like strong, independent central banks has been an important precursor to the
widespread adoption of floating currencies by many developed countries since the end of the
Bretton Woods system. Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) and Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989)
discuss how “tieing one’s hands” by pegging the currency to the German Deutsche Mark was
an important motivation behind the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the precursor to
the euro. Similarly, Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) discuss the practice of pegging
to gain credibility in many Latin American countries, and Mishkin and Calvo (2003) and
1Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2006), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), Walsh (2007), Gürkaynak,
Marder, Levin, and Swanson (2007), Benati (2008), Gonçalves and Salles (2008), Crowe (2010), Beechey,
Johannsen, and Levin (2011), Mehrotra and Yetman (2014), Davis (2014) all argue that the adoption of
inflation targeting has led to lower and more stable inflation and inflation expectations. However, Ball and
Sheridan (2005), Brito and Bystedt (2010), Lin and Ye (2007, 2009) argue that these effects are due to
common time components or selection bias and reversion to the mean (this would occur when inflation is
mean reverting and countries adopt inflation targeting only when inflation is high).
2Recently, following the adoption of an inflation targeting mandate by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
in 1989, inflation targeting has become the single mandate of choice in many developed and emerging market
economies.
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Husain, Mody, and Rogoff (2005) discuss this practice in many developing and emerging
market economies.
When modeling why countries may have a “fear of floating”, Calvo and Reinhart (2002)
specifically model how a central bank that lacks the ability to commit will find it optimal
to peg their exchange rate. Herrendorf (1997, 1999) discusses adopting a currency peg as
an effective communication device by a central bank that practices discretionary policy and
shows how pegging the currency has reputational benefits and may be a necessary precursor
for successfully floating the currency under a credible central bank.3
It is well known and has been extensively modelled how adopting one of these two single
mandates, inflation targeting or nominal exchange rate targeting, is a possible solution to the
time-inconsistency problem.4 This paper will show that the particular single mandate chosen
depends on trade openness and the credibility of the central bank. In order to improve welfare
given low central bank credibility, a highly open economy may find it optimal to adopt an
external target, like an exchange rate targeting mandate, while a relatively closed economy
will find it optimal to adopt a domestic target, like the inflation rate.5
We begin with the results from a reduced form empirical exercise which show that coun-
tries with low levels of central bank credibility or independence are more likely to adopt a
fixed exchange rate regime. Furthermore, these empirical results show that this tendency
to peg the exchange rate to overcome a lack of central bank credibility depends on trade
openness. Highly open economies are likely to adopt a pegged exchange rate to overcome
a lack of central bank credibility, but relatively closed economies are unlikely to adopt an
3In related empirical studies, Levy Yeyati, Sturzenegger, and Reggio (2010) show that the strength of
political institutions is one key factor in explaining exchange rate regime choice. Similarly, Hakura (2005)
finds that exchange rate flexibility in emerging market countries has increased over the past decade, and
argues that this “learning to float” appears to have involved a strengthening of monetary and financial policy
frameworks in many countries. Ghosh (2014) finds that trade openness leads to the tendency to adopt a
fixed currency in many emerging markets.
This is related to the seminal work in Romer (1993) which shows that the net benefits of an unexpected
monetary expansion decrease as trade openness increases. Therefore central banks in highly open economies
are much less likely to pursue such actions when engaging in discretionary monetary policy, and as a result,
the inflation bias associated with discretionary policy is lower for a highly open economy.
4Models of the Barro-Gordon type showing the advantages of pegging the currency when the central bank
lacks the ability to commit are detailed in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). One contribution of this paper is to
model the gains from pegging in the linear-quadratic framework from Woodford (2003).
5Here we assume that international capital markets are open, so as implied by the famous Mundell-
Flemming trilemma (see e.g. Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962)) the adoption of nominal exchange rate
targeting entails giving up an independent monetary policy. If one were to restrict capital market open-
ness, sterilized foreign exchange intervention would be possible, where the central bank could manage the
exchange rate using sterilized foreign exchange intervention and still maintain an independent monetary
policy. Empirically Ghosh, Ostry, and Chamon (2016) show that the combination of inflation targeting with
exchange rate targeting through sterilized foreign exchange intervention can result in a major improvement
in the volatility of certain observable variables.
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exchange rate peg, even at low levels of central bank credibility.
Using a model of optimal monetary policy in a small open economy, we show through
impulse response and welfare calculations that when the trade share is low, an inflation
targeting mandate results in higher social welfare than a nominal exchange rate targeting
mandate. But as the import share increases, the relative ordering switches and the nominal
exchange rate target outperforms inflation targeting (both domestic producer price inflation
targeting and consumer price inflation targeting).
However, in all these cases, welfare maximizing policy under commitment is better than
(or at least as good as) any simple rule monetary regime.6 Therefore we then model how a
central bank will find it optimal to adopt an inflation targeting or an exchange rate targeting
mandate as their credibility falls. Using the loose commitment framework of Schaumburg
and Tambalotti (2007) and Debortoli and Nunes (2010) we assume that central bank cred-
ibility lies on a continuum between perfect commitment and perfect discretion. We solve
for the optimal policy equilibrium for all values of the credibility along the continuum from
commitment to discretion. As credibility falls the outcome from welfare maximizing policy
gets progressively worse. We explore how the central bank could improve total social welfare
by adopting a different objective function that places greater weight on inflation stability or
on nominal exchange rate stability.7 We solve numerically for the optimal weight on inflation
or nominal exchange rate stability in the central bank’s objective function and show that it
is a function of the commitment probability. In that way we can analyze the link between
the central bank’s credibility and the optimal degree of inflation or exchange rate targeting.
When the economy is relatively closed, credibility has to be very low before the central
bank will find it optimal to switch from welfare maximizing policy to an exchange rate
targeting single mandate, and at some low levels of trade openness, purely discretionary
monetary policy outperforms an exchange rate target. However, for a country that is very
open to trade, the central bank will quickly abandon welfare maximizing policy and instead
adopt exchange rate targeting at even a relatively high level of credibility.8
6Throughout this paper we refer to “welfare maximizing policy” as a policy where the central bank
maximizes an objective function which is the second-order approximation of social welfare. The derivation
of this objective function in a small open economy under local currency pricing is an important technical
contribution of this paper.
7In that way, this model is a small open economy version of the Rogoff (1985) conservative central banker
in a linear quadratic framework.
8Devereux and Engel (2003) discuss the optimality of a fixed exchange rate regime, but in these models,
the central bank can commit. The prevalence of local currency pricing and the violation of the law of one
price either diminishes the expenditure switching benefit of a floating currency or imposes a cost in terms of
increased price dispersion.
Similarly, in a model where the central bank can commit, Kamenik and Kumhof (2014) compare the
welfare outcomes of a fixed exchange rate regime to a floating regime that follows a Taylor-type feedback
rule with a medium term inflation target.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some reduced form empirical results that
show the link between central bank credibility, trade openness, and the tendency to peg the
exchange rate are presented in section 2. A New Keynesian model of optimal monetary policy
in a small open economy is presented in section 3. The results from this model are presented
in section 4. Through impulse responses and the numerical calculation of welfare costs we
show how the relative costs and benefits of nominal exchange rate targeting depends on an
economy’s level of trade openness and central bank credibility. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical
Central banks that lack the ability to commit to future policy actions can improve their
monetary policy outcome by choosing to peg the nominal exchange rate to that of a more
credible partner. In this section we show empirical evidence that as a central bank gains
credibility, it tends to loosen any currency pegs and adopt a floating exchange rate. Further-
more, we show that the empirical link between central bank credibility and exchange rate
flexibility depends on a country’s level of trade openness.
2.1 Empirical model, variables, and data
We will estimate a panel data model with an index of exchange rate flexibility as the depen-
dent variable and a proxy for central bank credibility as the independent variable. In this
panel we use annual data from 96 countries over 13 years, from 1998-2010. The full list of
countries can be found in section 2 of the appendix.
The dependent variable in this empirical exercise is an index of whether a country has a
fixed or floating exchange rate from Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2008). This index varies
from (1) - “no separate legal tender” to (13) - “freely floating” and in between covers varying
degrees of exchange rate pegs. The exact definitions for each of the 13 index values are found
in the appendix.
As a proxy for central bank credibility we use the index of central bank independence
from Dincer and Eichengreen (2013). Central bank independence has been used as a proxy
for central bank credibility and institutional quality from as early as Cukierman (1992) and
Alesina and Summers (1993). Blinder (2000) reports that a vast majority of both central
bank governors and academic economists cite central bank independence as one of the most
important factors behind central bank credibility.
We also include a measure of trade openness (the sum of imports and exports divided by
GDP) as another independent variable and in one regression specification we estimate the
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interaction between central bank independence and trade openness.
As control variables in this panel data regression we include the CPI inflation rate and
the GDP growth rate in the previous year. We also include country fixed effects in this panel
data regression.
2.2 Empirical Results
The results from this panel data regression of exchange rate flexibility on central bank
independence are presented in table 1. The first two columns of the table present the results
from the panel that includes all 96 countries, and the last two columns in the table present
the results for the subsample of 75 developing and emerging market countries.
The coefficient of central bank independence is positive and significant, indicating that
when central bank independence improves in year t− 1, holding all else equal, the index of
exchange rate flexibility will shift towards floating in year t.
In the second column in the table we include an interaction term between central bank
credibility and the level of trade openness. The coefficient on this interaction term is positive
and significant, indicating that the link between central bank credibility and the desire to
peg the nominal exchange rate is a function of a country’s level of trade openness. For a
relatively closed economy there is not a significant relationship between credibility and the
desire to peg the exchange rate. For a highly open economy, the link between credibility and
the desire to peg the exchange rate is strong.
The lagged values of the CPI inflation rate or the GDP growth rate do not have an effect
on the degree of exchange rate flexibility. The last two columns in the table show that these
same results hold not just for the full panel of 96 countries but also for the sub-panel of 75
developing and emerging market countries.
3 Model
In the model there are two countries, home and foreign. The home country is of size n and
the foreign country is of size 1−n, and we consider a case of the small open economy where
n→ 0. The home economy is populated by a representative household and a continuum of
firms. Firms employ labor to produce a tradable consumption good and set prices according
to a Calvo style price setting framework. There is a central bank which sets the nominal
interest rate. We model outcomes under a few assumptions about the behavior of the central
bank. In some cases we assume that the central bank sets policy to maximize the second-
order approximation of household welfare. In others we assume that the central bank follows
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either a partial or full inflation or exchange rate target.
3.1 Households
In the small open home economy, the representative household chooses consumption, Ct,
and labor effort, Ht, to maximize expected lifetime utility given by:
maxE0
∞
t=0
βt


C1−ρt
1− ρ −
H1+ηt
1 + η

(1)
where β is the household’s discount factor, ρ is the inverse of the intertemporal substitution
elasticity, and η is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity.
The aggregate consumption good is simply the aggregation of domestic and imported
goods from individual firms aggregated in the CES function:
Ct =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
v
1
θ


1
n
 1
σ
 n
0
CHt (i)
σ−1
σ di
 σ
σ−1
 θ−1
θ
+(1− v)
1
θ


1
1−n
 1
σ
 1
n
CFt (j)
σ−1
σ dj
 σ
σ−1
 θ−1
θ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
θ
θ−1
(2)
where CHt (i) is the quantity of goods sold to the home market by home country firm i ∈ [0 n]
and CFt (j) is the quantity imported into the home market and sold by foreign country firm
j ∈ (n 1]. θ is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, and σ is the
elasticity of substitution between goods from different firms within the same country.
From the aggregator function in (2), the demand for either the home consumption good
from firm i or the foreign consumption good from firm j are given by:
CHt (i) = v

PHdt (i)
PHdt
	−σ 
PHdt
Pt
	−θ
Ct
CFt (j) = (1− v)

P Fxt (j)
P Fxt
	−σ 
P Fxt
Pt
	−θ
Ct
and the corresponding demand functions in the foreign economy are given by:
CF∗t (j) = v
∗

P Fdt (j)
P Fdt
	−σ 
P Fdt
P ∗t
	−θ
C∗t
CH∗t (i) = (1− v∗)

PHxt (i)
PHxt
	−σ 
PHxt
P ∗t
	−θ
C∗t
where PHdt (i) is the price set by firm i for the domestic market (in home currency), P
Hx
t (i)
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is the price of the home good from firm i in the foreign market (in foreign currency), P Fdt (j)
is the price set by foreign firm j for sales in the foreign market (in the foreign currency), and
P Fxt (j) is the price set by foreign firm j for sales in the home market (in home currency).
In the main text of this paper, we consider the model with local currency pricing, and thus
the home country firm i can set separate prices PHdt (i) and P
Hx
t (i) for the local and foreign
markets and the foreign country firm j can set separate prices P Fdt (j) and P
Fx
t (j). The
share of imported goods in the home consumption basket is given by 1− v and the share of
imported goods in the foreign consumption basket is given by 1− v∗.
Given the lack of full exchange rate pass through observed in the data (see e.g. Campa
and Goldberg (2005)), the assumption of local currency pricing is a more empirically relevant
starting point. In the appendix we will also consider the case of producer currency pricing.
In this the law of one price holds at the level of the individual good and thus exchange rate
pass through is complete: PHdt (i) = StP
Hx
t (i) and P
Fd
t (j) =
PFxt (j)
St
, where St is the nominal
exchange rate in units of the domestic currency per units of the foreign currency. Thus the
various price indices are given by:
PHdt =

1
n
 n
0
PHdt (i)
1−σ di
	 1
1−σ
and PHxt =

1
n
 n
0
PHxt (i)
1−σ di
	 1
1−σ
(3)
P Fdt =

1
1− n
 1
n
P Fdt (j)
1−σ dj
	 1
1−σ
and P Fxt =

1
1− n
 1
n
P Fxt (j)
1−σ dj
	 1
1−σ
Pt =

v

PHdt
1−θ
+ (1− v)

P Fxt
1−θ 11−θ
and P ∗t =

v∗

P Fdt
1−θ
+ (1− v∗)

PHxt
1−θ 11−θ
The home country domestic producer price inflation rate is given by πHdt =
PHdt
PHdt−1
−1, home
country import price inflation is given by πHmt =
PFxt
PFxt−1
− 1, and foreign country consumer
price inflation is given by π∗t =
P ∗t
P ∗t−1
−1. From the last identity we can express home country
consumer price inflation πCt = PtPt−1 − 1, as a weighted average of the inflation rate of home
and foreign produced goods and appreciation in the nominal exchange rate:
πCt = vπHdt + (1− v) πHmt
where 1 − v = (1− n)λ, and in the limit as n → 0, v = 1 − λ, where λ is the steady-state
import share. And thus consumer price inflation in the small open economy is simply a trade
weighted average of domestic producer inflation and imported inflation. Notice as well that
when the home economy is a small open economy, foreign consumer price inflation is equal
to foreign producer price inflation.
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In addition, the household’s labor supply decision can be expressed as:
Ht
η =
Wt
Pt
C−ρt (4)
3.1.1 Asset Market Structure
We assume that asset markets are complete both domestically and internationally. Thus
agents have access to a complete set of state-contingent securities. This implies that the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is equalized across countries:

Ct
Ct+1
	−ρ
πCt+1 =
St+1
St

C∗t
C∗t+1
	−ρ
π∗t+1 (5)
Using (5) and the definition of the real exchange rate, Qt =
StP ∗t
Pt
, after assuming that
countries have the same initial wealth levels it follows that:
Qt =

C∗t
Ct
	−ρ
(6)
Thus under complete asset markets, the price of the foreign consumption good relative
to the home consumption good, Qt, is equal to the marginal utility of foreign consumption
divided by the marginal utility of home consumption.
3.2 Firms
Home country firm i ∈ [0 n] produces output for the domestic market and for exports. The
firm’s total output is simply the sum of the two, Yt (i) = CHt (i)+
1−n
n
CH∗t (i), and is produced
with the following production technology:
Yt (i) = ht (i)
where ht (i) is the labor employed by the firm in period t. Market clearing in the labor
market requires that the total demand for labor by firms is equal to the supply of labor from
households,
 n
0
ht (i) di = Ht. The firm’s marginal cost of production is simply equal to the
wage rate.
In period t, the firm will be able to change its price(s) with probability 1− ξp. If allowed
9
to change their price in period t, the firm will set prices to maximize:
max
PHdt (i),P
Hx
t (i)
Et
∞
τ=0
βτ

ξp
τ
Λt+τ


PHdt (i)−Wt+τ (i)

CHt (i) +

StP
Hx
t (i)−Wt+τ (i)
 1− n
n
CH∗t (i)

where Λt is the marginal utility of household consumption in period t.
The firm that can change prices will set their prices to:
PHdt (i) =
Et
∞
τ=0
βτ

ξp
τ μt+τΛt+τWt+τ (i)CHt+τ (i)
Et
∞
τ=0
βτ

ξp
τ
Λt+τCHt+τ (i)
PHxt (i) =
Et
∞
τ=0
βτ

ξp
τ μt+τΛt+τWt+τ (i)CH∗t+τ (i)
Et
∞
τ=0
βτ

ξp
τ
St+τΛt+τCH∗t+τ (i)
where μt is the mark-up that the firm charges over expected future marginal cost. This
mark-up is stochastic and follows an AR(1) process described in the next subsection.
Similarly, the price set by foreign firms for exports into the home economy is given by:
PFxt (j) =
Et
∞
τ=0
βτ

ξp
τ μ∗t+τΛ∗t+τSt+τW ∗t+τ (j)CFt+τ (j)
Et
∞
τ=0
βτ

ξp
τ
Λ∗t+τC
F
t+τ (j)
Firms that can reset prices in period t will all reset to the same level, so PHdt (i) = P
Hd
t ,
PHxt (i) = P
Hx
t , and P
Fx
t (j) = P
Fx
t . Substitute these optimal prices into the price indices
PHdt =
 1
0

PHdt (i)
1−σ
di
 1
1−σ
, PHxt =
 1
0

PHxt (i)
1−σ
di
 1
1−σ
, and P Fxt =
 1
0
P Fxt (j)
1−σ dj
 1
1−σ
.
Since a firm has a probability of 1− ξp of being able to change their price, then by the law
of large numbers in any period 1− ξp percent of firms will reoptimize prices. Thus the price
indices can be written as:
PHdt =

ξp

PHdt−1
1−σ
+

1− ξp
 
PHdt
1−σ 11−σ
PHxt =

ξp

PHxt−1
1−σ
+

1− ξp
 
PHxt
1−σ 11−σ
P Fxt =

ξp

P Fxt−1
1−σ
+

1− ξp
 
PFxt
1−σ 11−σ
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3.2.1 Log-linearized model equations
The log-linearized equilibrium in this small open economy model can be expressed as solution
to a system of equations with 12 variables: (1) domestic producer price inflation , πHdt , (2)
export producer price inflation, πHxt , (3) import price inflation, πHmt , (4) the real price of
domestic production, pˆHdt , (5) the real price of exports, pˆ
Hx
t , (6) the real price of imports, pˆ
Fx
t ,
(7) consumer price inflation, πCt , (8) output, Yˆt, (9) consumption, Cˆt, (10) the real exchange
rate, Qˆt, (11) the change in the nominal exchange rate, dSˆt, (12) the markup shock, μˆt.
This model with 12 variables is described by 11 log-linearized equilibrium conditions.
The last equation is left for monetary policy, and is discussed in the next subsection. The
derivation of each of these log-linearized equations is presented in section 1 of the appendix.
A “hat” over a variable represents log-deviation from the steady state value.
The firm pricing decisions, combined with the labor market equilibrium condition in (4)
yield the following New Keynesian Phillips Curves:
πHdt = κ

μˆt + ηYˆt + ρCˆt − pˆHdt

+ βEt

πHdt+1

(7)
πHxt = κ

μˆt + ηYˆt + ρCˆt − Qˆt − pˆHxt

+ βEt

πHxt+1

(8)
πHmt = κ

Qˆt − pˆFxt

+ βEt

πHmt+1

(9)
where κ = (1−βξp)(1−ξp)ξp .
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The expression for the domestic consumer price index in (3) yields the following expression
for the real price of domestic production:
pˆHdt = −
λ
1− λ pˆ
Fx
t (10)
The definition of export price inflation leads to an equation describing the real price of
exports:
pˆHxt − pˆHxt−1 = πHxt (11)
Similarly the definition of import price inflation leads to an equation describing the real
price of imports:10
9Note that since the rest of the world is unaffected by events in the small open economy and the only
shocks are domestic shocks, foreign aggregate variables are unchanged and only the exchange rate will enter
the Phillips curve for import price inflation.
10In the model with producer currency pricing, the Phillips curve for πHdt remains the same in (7), but
the Phillips curve for πHxt is replaced with πHxt + dSˆt = πHdt , and the Phillips curve for πHmt is replaced
with πHmt = dSˆt. The expression linking the change in the real price of exports with export price inflation
in (11) is replaced with pˆHxt = pˆ
Hd
t − Qˆt. And the expression linking the change in the real price of imports
to import price inflation in (12) is replaced with pˆFxt = Qˆt.
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pˆFxt − pˆFxt−1 + πCt = πHmt (12)
Consumer price inflation is just a weighted average of domestic producer inflation and
import inflation:
πCt = (1− λ) πHdt + λπHmt (13)
The market resource constraint can be written as:
Yˆt = −θ (1− λ) pˆHdt − θλpˆHxt + (1− λ) Cˆt (14)
Consumption and the real exchange rate are linked with the asset market equilibrium
condition in (6):
Qˆt = ρCˆt (15)
Log-differences in the definition of the real exchange rate leads to the following expression
for the change in the nominal exchange rate:
Qˆt − Qˆt−1 = dSˆt − πCt (16)
Finally, the model is driven by a mark-up shock μˆt that follows an AR(1) process:
μˆt+1 = ρμμˆt + εt+1 (17)
3.3 Monetary Policy
The central bank sets monetary policy in order to maximize the second-order approximation
of the household’s welfare in (1). Gali and Monacelli (2005) and De Paoli (2009) derive this
loss function in the case of producer currency pricing. They show that the maximization of
the second-order approximation of welfare is equivalent to the minimization of the quadratic
loss function of the output gap, the inflation rate of home country produced goods, and the
real exchange rate.
In the main text we will instead consider the model of local currency pricing. The
quadratic form of the loss function under local currency pricing can be derived as the limiting
case in the model in Fujiwara and Wang (2017).11 It is more complicated, owing to the fact
that local currency pricing leads to violations of the law of one price and thus more distortions
11The quadratic loss is derived under commitment.
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in the economy (see e.g. Engel (2011)). The loss function takes the following functional form:
Lt =
1
2
Et
∞
τ=0
βτ
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Ψy

Yˆt+τ − Yˆ T,LCPt+τ
2
+Ψlop

pˆHxt+τ +
1
ρθ Qˆt+τ − pˆ
Hd
t+τ
2
+Ψπd

πHdt+τ
2
+Ψπx

πHxt+τ
2
+Ψπm

πHmt+τ
2
+Ψq

Qˆt+τ
2
+Ψpx

pˆHxt+τ
2
+Ψpf

pˆFxt+τ
2
+Ψqf

Qˆt+τ − pˆFxt+τ
2
+Ψqd

1−ρ
ρ Qˆt+τ + (1− θ) pˆ
Hd
t+τ
2
+Ψd

μˆt+τ + (η + 1) Yˆt+τ + θλ

pˆHxt+τ +
1
ρθ Qˆt+τ − pˆ
Hd
t+τ
2
+Ψx

μˆt+τ + ηYˆt+τ + ρCˆt+τ − Qˆt+τ − pˆHxt+τ
2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(18)
The functional forms and numerical values of these 12 loss function coefficients are found
in section 1 of the appendix.
Welfare maximizing policy will maximize social welfare (minimize the derived social loss
function, Lt) subject to the log-linearized model equations (7)-(17).
3.3.1 Boundary cases
In the first set of results we will close the model under four boundary cases of monetary
policy. The first case is where the central bank can perfectly commit, and thus it will
minimize social loss Lt by specifying the expected future path of domestic producer price
inflation

πHdt+τ
∞
τ=0
conditional on a sequence of cost-push shocks.12
In addition to examining the outcomes under the ideal perfect commitment case, we will
consider three monetary regimes where the central bank’s optimization problem is replaced
with a single mandate. The first is a purely external single mandate, a nominal exchange
rate targeting regime, dSˆt = 0. Next, we consider a purely domestic single mandate, a strict
domestic producer price inflation targeting regime, πHdt = 0. Finally we consider the strict
consumer price inflation targeting regime πCt = 0.
3.3.2 Beyond boundary cases: Loose commitment and partial targeting
After comparing nominal exchange rate targeting or inflation targeting to welfare maxi-
mizing policy under commitment we take a more granular approach. Instead of assuming
that the central bank can perfectly commit, we assume that the central bank displays loose
commitment, as in Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), Debortoli and Nunes (2010), De-
12Since this is a model with full information, the central bank can make policy by specifying the future
path of any endogenous variable in the model, which variable is chosen as the policy instrument doesn’t
matter, so we simply pick πHd. See Herrendorf (1997, 1999) for an example of a model where the central
bank has private information that is not available to agents in the economy. In this case, the choice of a
policy instrument is important.
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bortoli, Maih, and Nunes (2014), and Dennis (2014). Fujiwara, Kam, and Sunakawa (2016)
show that outcomes of welfare maximizing policy with loose commitment are observationally
equivalent to, or can be interpreted as, outcomes of optimal policy under sustainable plans,
as in Chari and Kehoe (1990). With a certain exogenous probability policy makers may re-
nege on their earlier commitments. This exogenous probability is known by all agents in the
model. In any given period, the central bank will honor past commitments with probability
γ and it will renege on previous commitments and reoptimize with probability 1− γ.
The central bank will seek to minimize the loss function in (18) subject to equations (7)-
(17) and the commitment probability γ. As γ falls and the central bank lacks the ability to
commit, welfare maximizing policy given γ might not be the policy that maximizes ex-ante
social welfare. To improve ex-ante social welfare and partially make up for the fact that the
central bank displays limited commitment, the central bank may ex-ante choose to minimize
a different loss function than the social loss function. This alternative loss function is known
to all agents in the model and is a way to tie the central bank’s hands and force them to
adopt a policy that better mirrors the policy under perfect commitment. This alternative
loss function doesn’t actually make the central bank able to commit, and it still will renege
with the exogenous probability 1 − γ. But by adopting a different objective function and
thus a different set of trade-offs, the central bank that cannot perfectly commit can partially
mitigate the time inconsistency problem and improve total social welfare given its limited
ability to commit.
This is the idea behind the famous Rogoff (1985) conservative central banker. For this
alternative loss function, we consider three possibilities. In the first, the policy maker places
more weight on a domestic target, the domestic producer price inflation rate, in the second
they place more weight on CPI inflation, and in the third the policy maker places more
weight on an external target, the nominal exchange rate:
L˜t = Lt + Et
∞
τ=0
βτψi (γ) (i)
2 for i = πHdt+τ , πCt+τ , or dSˆt+τ (19)
As the value of ψi (γ) gets larger, monetary policy that minimizes the objective function
L˜t approaches the case of domestic producer price inflation targeting, consumer price inflation
targeting, or exchange rate targeting: πHdt+τ = 0, πCt+τ = 0, or dSˆt+τ = 0.
This modification of the social loss function, ψi (γ), can be derived from numerical sim-
ulations of the model.
Commitment to what? If the central bank can perfectly commit, it specifies a future
path of domestic producer price inflation

πHdt+τ
∞
τ=0
conditional on a sequence of shocks
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
μˆt+τ
∞
τ=0
that would minimize its objective function subject to the New Keynesian Phillips
curves and market resource constraints. If the central bank can perfectly commit to this
policy path and agents believe them, this will pin down the path of expected inflation. In
the model with loose commitment, the central bank will specify a future path of inflation
πHdt+τ
∞
τ=0
conditional on a sequence of shocks which would minimize its objective function
at time t, but in the next period with probability 1 − γ it will reoptimize and specify a
new future path of domestic producer price inflation

πHdt+1+τ
∞
τ=0
that would minimize its
objective function at time t+ 1.
When forming expectations, agents would know that the reneging on past promises is a
possibility. So when forming expectations given that the central bank displays loose com-
mitment, expected inflation is not the same as the central bank’s specified future path of
inflation.
If given the chance to reoptimize, the central bank may break past promises and reop-
timize because there are multiple terms in its objective function. In time t it may specify
a future path of inflation

πHdt+τ
∞
τ=0
that would minimize its objective function conditional
on a sequence of shocks. If this announcement is believed by the agents in the model, this
will fix inflation expectations. In time t+1 the central bank may take advantage of the fact
that inflation expectations are fixed and deviate from their past promises in order to gain a
temporary benefit in one of their other objectives, like output gap stabilization.
Thus as ψ (γ) → ∞ in the modified central bank objective function in (19), it removes
the multiple terms from the central bank’s objective function. Without multiple terms in the
objective function, even if the central bank could reoptimize, it would specify the same path.
As ψπH (γ)→∞, ψπC (γ)→∞ or ψS (γ)→∞, the central bank’s only concern is domestic
producer price inflation stability, consumer price inflation stability or nominal exchange rate
stability. Thus the central bank will announce a path of

πHdt+τ = 0
∞
τ=0
,

πCt+τ = 0
∞
τ=0
or

dSˆt+τ = 0
∞
τ=0
. If allowed to reoptimize in period t + 1, optimal policy will still be

πHdt+1+τ = 0
∞
τ=0
,

πCt+1+τ = 0
∞
τ=0
or

dSˆt+1+τ = 0
∞
τ=0
.
Thus as ψπH (γ) → ∞, ψπC (γ) → ∞ or ψS (γ) → ∞, the central bank adopts an
inflation or exchange rate target. This target is actually built into the central bank’s objective
function, so in the model of loose commitment, when the central bank is allowed with
probability 1 − γ to reoptimize, they will reoptimize the objective function containing this
ψ (γ). The model of loose commitment does not consider the possibility that the central
bank would renege on their commitment to an inflation or exchange rate target, which
would be like saying that between period t and t + 1, ψ (γ) falls to zero. In the model of
loose commitment, the coefficients in the central bank’s objective function are time invariant.
By assuming shocks are not permanent we assume that ultimately all variables revert to
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their steady state values, thus if the target is the steady state value, the inflation target or
exchange rate target is sustainable. Furthermore, since the central bank’s objective function,
including the ψi (γ) coefficient is known by all agents in the model, agents believe the central
bank’s commitment to any peg. And agents will not engage in the type of speculative attack
that could lead to the breaking of an exchange rate regime and currency crisis.
At first glance, the assumption that even the central bank that cannot commit to a future
course of policy given multiple terms in its objective function can still commit to something
like a fixed exchange rate regime may seem like a stretch. After all, Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995) discuss the “mirage of fixed exchange rates” and note the high rate of failure of many
exchange rate pegs. But Klein and Shambaugh (2008) note that while many exchange rate
pegs fail, most fail quickly, possibly because the peg was set to an unreasonable level or it
was brought down by speculative attacks from agents unsure of the central bank’s objective.
Klein and Shambaugh (2008) find that conditional on lasting two years, exchange rate pegs
are very sustainable, and when a peg is broken following a shock, it is quickly reestablished.
3.4 Calibration
The calibrated values of the structural parameters in the model are presented in table 2. The
discount factor is set to 0.99 in this quarterly model. The Calvo price stickiness parameter
ξp is set such that firms adjust prices on average once every 4 quarters. The labor supply
elasticity is set to 1. The elasticity of substitution between goods from different firms is set
to 10, and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is set to 3. Both
values are common in the international macro literature. The intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is set to 1, indicating that agents have log-utility over consumption.
Numerical simulations of the model are calculated in response to home country mark-
up shocks. We assume that these shocks follow an AR(1) process with an autoregressive
parameter of ρμ = 0.8 and that these shocks have a standard deviation of 1%.
In section 3 of the appendix we present extensive results showing the robustness of the
model to different values of these parameters. Armenter and Bodenstein (2009) show that the
persistence of shocks has a major effect on the benefits of a single mandate policy rule over
purely discretionary monetary policy. When shock persistence is low, welfare maximizing
policy, even under a central bank that cannot commit, yields a better outcome than a single
mandate. So while in our benchmark results, we assume that the persistence of the cost-push
shocks, ρμ = 0.8, in the appendix we test the robustness of the results to the assumption
of very persistent cost-push shocks, ρμ = 0.95, or i.i.d. shocks, ρμ = 0. In section 3 of
the appendix we also check the robustness of the results to changing the price stickiness
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parameter ξp, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods θ, and the labor
supply elasticity η. In the appendix we also test the robustness of the results in the model
with producer currency pricing.
4 Model Results
To examine the costs and benefits of adopting a simple rule like inflation targeting or nominal
exchange rate targeting and discuss why trade openness is such an important factor in the
decision to peg the exchange rate, we first calculate welfare costs under four assumptions
about monetary policy. In one, monetary policy is set to maximize social welfare and the
central bank can commit, and then we consider three single mandate regimes: the central
bank follows a domestic producer price inflation targeting rule, the central bank follows a
simple nominal exchange rate targeting rule, or the central bank follows a consumer price
inflation targeting rule. We show that the costs and benefits of these simple rules depend
on the economy’s level of trade openness.
We then adopt a more granular approach. With the loose commitment framework, perfect
commitment and perfect discretion are boundary cases where the commitment probability
is either 1 or 0. We can then calculate how a central bank with a given commitment
probability might find it optimal to minimize an objective function that places greater weight
on stabilizing the exchange rate or inflation.
4.1 Impulse responses under different monetary regimes
The responses of the home country output gap, inflation rate, and real exchange rate to a
home country mark-up shock are shown in figure 1. The left-hand column of each figure
presents the results from the model assuming an import share λ = 0.1, and the right-
hand column assumes an import share λ = 0.5. The solid blue line in each figure presents
the results assuming welfare maximizing policy under commitment (recall that when the
central bank can commit, welfare maximizing policy is optimal), the red dashed line assumes
strict domestic producer price inflation targeting, the green line with stars assumes nominal
exchange rate targeting, and the purple dotted line assumes strict consumer price inflation
targeting.
Domestic producer price inflation targeting perfectly stabilizes domestic producer price
inflation but the cost is higher output volatility as every shock has to be absorbed by fluctu-
ations in output. Nominal exchange rate targeting allows some absorption through inflation,
and thus following a shock, the result is higher inflation volatility but lower output volatility.
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The response of the output gap following a shock is lower than it would have been under
welfare maximizing policy and the response of inflation is greater. CPI inflation targeting
produces responses between those from domestic producer price inflation targeting and ex-
change rate targeting, and when the trade share is low, CPI inflation targeting produces
results that are very similar to domestic producer price inflation targeting.
In the figure, as the trade share increases, the volatility of inflation under welfare max-
imizing policy increases. Thus the central bank of a more open economy is willing to allow
more of the shock to be absorbed by inflation. Thus the responses under exchange rate tar-
geting are closer to optimal policy when the import share is high, and the responses under
domestic producer price inflation targeting are closer to the optimal when the import share
is low.
4.2 Social loss under different monetary regimes
The volatility of the output gap, the domestic producer price inflation rate, the real exchange
rate and the total social loss as a function of the import share λ are presented in figure 2. The
solid blue line in each figure presents the results assuming welfare maximizing policy under
commitment, the red dashed line assumes strict domestic producer price inflation targeting,
the green line with stars assumes nominal exchange rate targeting, and the purple dotted
line assumes strict consumer price inflation targeting.
This repeats the same trends that we see in the impulse response analysis. Output
gap volatility is lowest under nominal exchange rate targeting and highest under domestic
producer price inflation targeting, and inflation volatility is highest under nominal exchange
rate targeting and zero under domestic producer price inflation targeting. As we see in
the impulse response analysis, under welfare maximizing policy, inflation volatility is an
increasing function of the import share, implying that the central bank of a more open
economy is willing to tolerate more inflation volatility.
The lower-right-hand plot presents the difference between social welfare loss under one
of the three simple rules and social welfare loss under welfare maximizing policy. Welfare
maximizing policy under perfect commitment of course results in a lower social welfare loss
than any of the simple rule regimes. For low levels of trade openness, domestic producer
price inflation targeting results in a lower social loss than nominal exchange rate targeting,
but as the trade share increases, this ordering reverses. At some point, under this calibration
where λ > 0.2, the ordering changes and nominal exchange rate targeting results in a lower
social welfare loss than domestic producer price inflation targeting, implying that as the
trade share increases, the relative benefits of nominal exchange rate targeting increase.
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The consumer price inflation targeting regime and the domestic producer price inflation
targeting regime are equivalent when λ = 0. As λ increases, consumer price inflation tar-
geting results in a lower social welfare loss than domestic producer price inflation targeting.
CPI inflation targeting outperforms exchange rate targeting, but around the point where
λ > 0.35, nominal exchange rate targeting results in a lower welfare loss than CPI inflation
targeting.
4.3 The optimal weight on exchange rate stability, ψ
Naturally, welfare maximizing policy under commitment is optimal, and thus it is better
than (or at least as good as) any other monetary regime. To understand why economies may
choose to adopt a single mandate, and specifically why a highly open economy may adopt
nominal exchange rate targeting, we relax the assumption that the central bank can commit.
For this we turn to the “loose commitment” framework of Schaumburg and Tambalotti
(2007) and Debortoli and Nunes (2010). In any period, the central bank will honor past
commitments with probability γ and it will renege on previous commitments and reoptimize
with probability 1 − γ. This exogenous probability is known by all agents in the model.
Commitment from the previous section is a special case where γ = 1. Purely discretionary
policy would be the special case where γ = 0.
The change in welfare loss as the central bank’s commitment probability γ changes is
plotted in figure 3. Each figure presents the difference between welfare loss for a certain
value of the commitment probability γ and welfare loss under welfare maximizing policy
under commitment. Since welfare maximizing policy under commitment (γ = 1) always
yields a lower social loss than policy when γ < 1, the difference is always positive. The
different plots in the figure assume different values of the steady state import share λ. The
figure shows that welfare loss rises quickly as γ decreases.
One possible solution for the central bank to overcome the problem of loose commitment
is to maximize an objective function that is different than the social welfare function. Three
possible candidates are given in (19). Under one possible candidate, the central bank places
more weight on domestic producer price inflation ψπH (γ), under the second the central bank
places weight on consumer price inflation ψπC (γ), and under the third the central bank
places weight on nominal exchange rate stability ψS (γ).
The values of these functions ψi (γ) that minimize the social loss for a given value of
γ are solved for numerically. The numerically derived functions ψπH (γ), ψπC (γ), or ψS (γ)
that minimize total social loss are presented in figure 4. In each graph, four lines are plotted,
corresponding to different values of the steady state import share, λ: the red dashed line is
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calculated for λ = 0.5, the green line with stars is calculated for λ = 0.38, the blue solid line
is calculated for λ = 0.25, and the purple dotted line is calculated for λ = 0.12.
As ψ (γ) gets larger, monetary policy approaches one of the single mandates discussed
earlier, and for practical purposes in this numerical simulation, when ψ (γ) approaches 500,
the weight on the added inflation or exchange rate term in the loss function becomes so
large that for all practical purposes, monetary policy converges to a single mandate rule (the
numerical values of each of the loss function coefficients are presented in section 1 of the
appendix, the value ψ (γ) = 500 is large enough relative to these loss function coefficients
to drive the objective function towards a single mandate) . When γ is close to 1, indicating
near perfect commitment, the value of ψ (γ) is 0, and as γ falls the optimal weight increases,
so dψ(γ)
dγ < 0.
But it is interesting to note the speed at which the central bank finds optimal to adopt
one of these mandates as the commitment probability falls, and how this varies depending
on the level of trade openness.
The top graph in the figures shows the results for the case of the domestic producer price
inflation target. When the trade share is high, the central bank never finds it optimal to
adopt a domestic producer price inflation target as a single mandate, even as γ approaches
zero. When the trade share is low the central bank will find it optimal to target domestic
producer price inflation for low levels of the commitment probability. When λ = 0.12 the
central bank will adopt a domestic producer price inflation target when the commitment
probability falls below 40%. When λ = 0.25 it will adopt a domestic producer price inflation
target when the commitment probability is around 10%.13
The middle graph in the figures shows the results for the case of the consumer price
inflation target. Placing weight on consumer price inflation outperforms the model of placing
extra weight on domestic producer price inflation, and the central bank will adopt a strict
consumer price inflation target when the commitment probability falls below 50%. The
trade share has a slight effect on the level of the commitment probability at which the
central bank adopts a CPI inflation target, and the central bank will adopt a CPI inflation
target at a higher level of the commitment probability when the trade share is high. But the
difference is small. When λ = 0.5 the central bank will adopt a CPI inflation target when
the commitment probability falls below 55%, and when λ = 0.25, this probability cutoff is
45%.
13In the appendix we present the results from the model assuming producer currency pricing. In this
model, the central bank will find it optimal to adopt a domestic producer price inflation target at low levels
of the commitment probability. This mirrors the result in Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006), which find that
under local currency pricing, domestic inflation targeting fares rather poorly, but under producer currency
pricing, domestic inflation targeting can be an optimal policy.
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The bottom graph in the figure presents the optimal weight on exchange rate stability in
the central bank’s modified objective function. When the trade share is high, the central bank
will adopt an exchange rate target at a much higher level of the commitment probability.
When the import share λ = 0.5, the central bank switches from welfare maximizing policy
to a nominal exchange rate targeting single mandate when the commitment probability falls
below 70%, but when λ = 0.38 the exchange rate target does not become optimal until the
commitment probability falls below 50%, and when λ = 0.25, this probability cutoff is just
over 15%.
For the small economy that is nearly closed to trade the function ψS (γ) remains equal
to 0 at all levels of γ, indicating that even a central bank that lacks any ability to commit,
γ = 0, will still find it optimal to practice discretionary monetary policy instead of nominal
exchange rate targeting. In other words, dψS(γ)
dγ ≈ 0 when λ is close to zero.
The slope dψS(γ)
dγ depends on the level of trade openness, the slope is steeper (more
negative) for a very open economy than for a relatively closed economy, so the numerically
derived function ψS (γ) can more accurately be written as ψS (γ;λ), where
d2ψS(γ;λ)
dγdλ < 0.
Returning now to the welfare loss graphs in figure 3. As discussed earlier, the blue solid
line in each graph represents the welfare loss under welfare maximizing policy. The red
dashed line represents the social welfare loss when the central bank is instead minimizing
the alternative objective function that places weight on domestic producer price inflation
stability, the purple dotted line plots loss when the alternative objective function contains a
role for consumer price inflation, and the green dash-dot line plots loss when the central bank
is minimizing the alternative objective function that places weight on nominal exchange rate
stability.
The lines are indistinguishable at high levels of γ, but at lower levels of γ the lines
representing welfare costs when the central bank places more weight on inflation or nominal
exchange rate stability diverge. The welfare costs to adding weight to domestic producer
price inflation are always higher than the costs to adding weight to consumer price inflation.
For low levels of λ, adding weight to exchange rate stability results in a greater social loss
than the two inflation stability regimes. But as λ increases the relative performance of an
objective function that favors exchange rate stability improves.
4.3.1 Parallels with the empirical results
The results from the model show that as the probability of commitment falls, the central bank
will find it optimal to modify their objective function and place more weight on exchange
rate stability. And in the model, this tendency to substitute exchange rate stabilization for
a low commitment probability is especially pronounced for a highly open economy.
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If we assume that the commitment probability γ in the model of loose commitment is
related to the credibility index in the empirical results, and that the weight on the exchange
rate in the central bank’s modified loss function is inversely related to the exchange rate
regime index from the empirical results, then the results in columns 1 and 3 of table 1 would
imply that dψS(γ)
dγ < 0, exactly as is predicted by the model with loose commitment.
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Furthermore, if we consider the steady state import share λ in the model to be positively
related to the empirical trade share, then the results in columns 2 and 4 of the table would
imply that d
2ψS(γ;λ)
dγdλ < 0, and for a country that is relatively closed to trade, where the trade
share variable is close to zero, dψS(γ)
dγ ≈ 0, both of these results are predicted by the model
with loose commitment.15
5 Summary and Conclusion
Why do countries adopt an inflation target or a fixed exchange rate? One answer is that
the country lacks the ability to commit to a future course of monetary policy actions. This
time-inconsistency problem can be mitigated when the central bank adopts a single mandate
like a mandate for inflation stabilization or nominal exchange rate stabilization. The costs
and benefits of these monetary regimes depend on a country’s level of trade openness.
The results in this paper show that in response to shocks that force the central bank
to make a trade-off between inflation and output growth, nominal exchange rate targeting
is more “dovish” than optimal policy, and a strict mandate for domestic producer price
inflation stabilization is more “hawkish” than optimal. That is, a nominal exchange rate
targeting regime would result in greater inflation variability relative to output variability
than would occur if the central bank were practicing optimal policy under commitment,
and a strict domestic producer price inflation target would lead to no inflation variability,
but at the expense of high output variability. But for exchange rate targeting, the extent
of this dovishness is a function of the import share, as trade openness increases, monetary
policy under nominal exchange rate targeting gets closer to optimal monetary policy, and the
14Recall that as the exchange rate index increases, the currency moves towards floating on the fix-float
scale, but as ψS increases, the central bank places more weight on exchange rate stability in their objective
functions.
15It should be emphasized that the link between the empirical results and those in the model are qualitative,
not quantitative. In the empirical section we used central bank independence as a proxy for the commitment
probability γ in the model and an index of exchange rate flexibility as a proxy for the weight on the exchange
rate ψS . We are not claiming to know the quantitative relationship between the credibility index and the
commitment probability or between the index of exchange rate flexibility and the weight on exchange rate
stability in the central bank’s loss function. So we cannot make a quantitative claim about the empirical
relationship between the credibility index and the exchange rate flexibility index, and how it relates to the
quantitative relationship between the probability of commitment and the weight on exchange rate stability.
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exchange rate targeting rule delivers higher social welfare than an inflation targeting rule.
Empirically, this is in fact the case. In a panel data regression, as central bank inde-
pendence (a proxy for credibility) falls, a central bank is more likely to adopt an exchange
rate peg. Crucially, this link between credibility and exchange rate flexibility is a function
of trade openness, and this empirical link is strong for highly open economies but weak for
relatively closed economies. These empirical findings are perfectly matched in a model of
loose commitment, as the central bank’s ability to commit falls, the highly open economy
will quickly find it optimal to abandon an independent monetary policy and tie their hands
by pegging the nominal exchange rate. For less open economies, this willingness to adopt
a fixed exchange rate is much weaker. For a low enough level of trade openness, a purely
discretionary monetary policy is still superior to an exchange rate peg.
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Table 2: Model parameter values.
Parameters Values Explanation
ξp 0.75 Percent of firms that cannot change price in a given period
β 0.99 Subjective discount factor
η 1 Inverse of the Frisch elasticity
σ 10 Elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods from same country
θ 3 Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
ρ 1 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
κ 0.08 (1−βξp)(1−ξp)ξp
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Figure 1: Responses to a cost-push shock.
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The left hand column is for the economy with a low import share and the right hand column is
for a high import share. Blue solid line: Commitment, Purple dotted line: CPI inflation targeting
, Red dashed line: Domestic producer price inflation targeting, Green starred line: Exchange rate
targeting
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Figure 2: Volatilities of the output gap, inflation, and the real exchange rate as a function
of the import share
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Blue solid line: Welfare maximizing policy under commitment, Red dashed line: Domestic
inflation targeting, Green starred line: Exchange rate targeting, Purple dotted line: CPI inflation
targeting.
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Figure 3: Social welfare loss as a function of the commitment probability γ, under 4 levels
of trade openness.
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Blue solid line: Welfare maximizing policy, Red dashed line: Extra weight on domestic producer
price inflation, Green dash-dot line: Weight on exchange rate stability, Purple dotted line: Weight
on CPI inflation.
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Figure 4: Optimal weight on inflation or nominal exchange rate stability in the central bank’s
loss function as a function of the commitment probability.
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Red dashed line is for import share, λ = 0.5, green line with stars is for λ = 0.38, blue solid line
is for λ = 0.25, and purple dotted line is for λ = 0.12.
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